

NOVEMBER 1951

# ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST

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**Partners in Common Defense**

Brigadier General George H. Olmsted

**Airships Have the Right of Way**

**European Aliens in the Army**

**War Trophies Tell History's Story**

**Army Antiaircraft Artillery Training**

**The Munitions Board's Conservation Program**



**SPRING CAMPAIGN IN KOREA**



# ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST



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## MDAP SPELLS STRENGTH

Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the United States is providing to the free nations of the world the weapons, technical assistance and materials that will enable them to stand resolute and unyielding against Communist aggressive threats. In this issue the Director of the Office of Military Assistance traces the extent of MDAP aid in building up the defenses of Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America.

## EUROPEANS IN OUR ARMY

A carefully selected group of Europeans have found an opportunity to show their personal determination to resist Communist domination by enlisting in the United States Army. Their selection and processing is described in "These Aliens Also Serve."

## BLIMPS VERSUS SUBS

The tracking of elusive submarines from the air is one of the missions of lighter-than-air craft in the Navy's hunter-killer team, designed to protect our sea lanes in any future war. Past performance and future potentialities of lighter-than-air craft are covered in "Airships Have the Right of Way."

## CHORWON TO KAESONG

In an article which completes his story of the Eighth Army's first year of Korean fighting, Captain James H. Tate describes the panoramic scene from the April 1951 action in the Iron Triangle sector to the Kaesong conferences.

Also in this issue, the action of Canadian Navy units in Korean waters underscores the many-sided nature of the conflict there.

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U. S. Army Photograph

**MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE H. OLMSTED, USAR**

General Olmsted was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1922 and a year later entered civilian life, serving as president of insurance and banking companies in his native Des Moines, Iowa. In 1942 he was called to active duty and in 1943 became Chief, Requirements and Assignments Branch, International Division, Army Service Forces. In 1945 he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, for the United States Army Forces in the China Theater of Operations. He returned to civilian life after World War II but was again recalled to active duty in December 1950 and named Deputy for Foreign Military Aid to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army. On 27 August 1951 he became Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense.



# PARTNERS IN COMMON DEFENSE

*By*

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE H. OLMSTED

THE United States and the other nations of the free world are building a mighty military force for common defense against the Soviet threat to peace and security. We are expanding our Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force at home and using our greater strength to help our allies build their armed forces around the world.

Security of American lives and property against Soviet attack is the primary purpose of the United States foreign military aid program. It assists our partners in common defense in safeguarding their nations against Soviet aggression—protection which could not be achieved without our help.


The United States foreign military program provides three types of assistance to participating countries—weapons and equipment, training and technical assistance, and materials to enable each nation to increase its own military production. All three types of assistance may be furnished on a grant basis or, under certain conditions, on a reimbursable basis to countries able and willing to pay. Many of these nations had their defense production facilities destroyed in World War II and now lack weapons and equipment to supply their expanding armed forces. As our foreign military aid effort developed during the past two years and materiel moved out under our Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), these countries have been able to re-equip land, sea and air units. We have strengthened their will to resist and have given impetus to more self-help within each country.

Our program does not attempt to carry more than a part of the burden in any country; it provides for deficiencies so that each nation can go forward in building its armed forces. As the countries gradually become able to provide for their total needs, the extent of United States aid will be reduced and phased out.

The United States cannot afford to fight alone against Soviet aggression wherever Communist forces may attempt to overrun another part of the free world. Our security depends on having strong partners with the manpower, the means and the will to defend themselves. Our foreign military aid makes it possible for these countries to raise the

needed divisions and to build their navies and air forces for our side. The cost in men, dollars and materiel would be many times greater if we had to do the whole job at home. The six and one-half billion dollars spent for our Mutual Defense Assistance Program in fiscal years 1950 and 1951 and the additional funds sought under the new eight and one-half billion dollar Mutual Security Program are a small insurance premium for partners in common defense. War would be extremely more costly and defeat would be unthinkable.

As of 30 June 1951 more than 1,500,000 tons of equipment were supplied to our allies under MDAP since the initial shipments began in March 1950. In addition, aircraft and naval vessels were delivered under their own power. The bulk of the equipment, more than 1,000,000 tons, has been shipped to Western Europe while 400,000 tons went to the Middle East and 200,000 tons to the Far East, exclusive of Korea. This included 4400 tanks and combat vehicles, 2900 major pieces of artillery, more than 18,000 general purpose vehicles, more than 900 aircraft and more than 180 naval vessels and small craft. Boxed and crated equipment included small arms, mortars, recoilless rifles, communications and electronic equipment, all types of



Tanks are among the many types of materiel sent to allied nations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

U. S. Army Photograph

spare parts and millions of rounds of ammunition. MDAP also provided for the training of more than 18,000 foreign nationals in the proper use and maintenance of this equipment. More than 9000 are in training or have completed training at Army, Navy and Air Force installations in this country and at American facilities in Europe. New groups are being selected under the expanded training program. (See "Training Our Allies Under MDAP," December 1950 DIGEST.)


**EUROPE.** A free Europe is vital to United States security. Loss of Europe to the Soviet Union would compel us to convert the United States into an isolated garrison state with a stronger enemy facing us across the water. Our primary concern in Europe is not how to win a war after it gets started but how to prevent it and how to help Europe stay free in the meantime. This involves three deterrent factors. First is the retaliatory power now in our possession—our capability of striking with air power against the centers of aggression. Second is the reserve power which helps to convince the Russians they could not win in the end. Finally there are the integrated forces of the North Atlantic Treaty nations now being built up under direction of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The re-creation of military strength by the European nations is a progressive process. Governments, many of them coalition governments, face difficulties in demanding of parliaments additional sacrifices by peoples just recovering from a decade of war and painful reconstruction—sacrifices far greater than a proportionate effort would require of the American people.

Our European allies had 2,000,000 men in their armed forces early in 1951 and more men have continued to come in since then. Lengthened periods of conscription and training, improvement of facilities for military use, more efficient organization and substantial additions to available equipment have greatly increased the combat effectiveness of their forces. Defense expenditures and military production are increasing. As tangible evidence of increased forces has grown, public morale and the will to resist have improved.

The great preponderance of the world's economic and productive strength at present is available to Western Europe and the United States and this strength, properly applied and supported by improving morale and determination, clearly can swing the balance of military power in favor of the free nations of the world.

The MDAP for Europe is providing spare parts and replacements for United States equipment previously furnished but not yet manufactured abroad. Also supplied will be materiel needed to complete the equipping of units already in being. It will also furnish a portion of the equipment for the additional forces which the North Atlantic



United States ships are turned over to the Italian fleet.

U. S. Army Photograph



Armored vehicles to reinforce allied defenses await shipment under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

U. S. Army Photograph

Treaty countries are organizing and which cannot be supplied from European production.

The equipment programmed includes various military weapons, with stress on complicated mechanisms which can be produced more quickly in larger quantity in the United States than abroad. Most of this equipment will be tanks, other combat vehicles, modern fighter airplanes and some mine sweepers and escort vessels. There will also be large supplies of artillery and fire control equipment, ammunition, motor-transport vehicles, naval and air force ordnance items and electronic devices of many varieties. Spare parts and maintenance materiel needed to keep equipment serviceable for an initial period are also included. No materiel will be delivered to Europe except where there are forces actually available to use it effectively.

Increasing support of our occupation forces in Western Germany is assisting in the effort and this area may later make more direct contributions to the common defense. Military aid is also going to Yugoslavia which now has the largest armed force in Western Europe.

**THE MIDDLE EAST.** The countries of the Middle East are less developed industrially than is Europe. That part of the world also is more directly exposed to Soviet pressure. The Middle East is vital to the security of the United States and of the free world because it stands directly in the path of Soviet expansionism; military preparedness for it is imperative. The area supplies three-fourths of the oil for Western Europe. It lies athwart the principal lines of sea and air communication in the Eastern Hemisphere. It is a land bridge between Asia and Africa and control of it by the Soviets would expose the African continent.

United States military and other assistance already has enabled Turkey to resist Soviet pressure firmly and has helped Greece to defeat the Soviet-inspired guerrilla forces. But Soviet aggression continues in many forms through the Middle East. Continued MDAP aid to Greece, Turkey and Iran is making it possible for these countries to strengthen their armed forces, maintain security against guerrilla activity and Soviet-inspired disorder, and build up their defenses to repel or at least delay any Soviet attack. It is proposed that part of the MDAP funds for this area should be available for military assistance purposes in the Arab States and Israel, if required by one or another of these countries.

**ASIA.** In Asia, in a vast arc stretching from Afghanistan to Korea, free countries are struggling to combat Soviet aggression in many forms. The Kremlin already has made China a satellite and turned its armies loose in Korea. Communist-fostered rebellion is raging in Indo-China. Soviet-inspired groups are stirring up disorder in Burma,



Thailand natives ferry ashore a light bomber.

U. S. Navy Photograph

the Philippines and other places. The campaign threatens to absorb the manpower and vital resources of the East into the Soviet design of world conquest and to deprive the free world of some of the most vitally needed raw materials.

This region, astride the Pacific Ocean lines of communication, is largely contiguous with the Communist-dominated central land mass of Asia and faces the United States across the water in the West.

United States foreign military aid in this area—exclusive of Korea where our own forces are joined with the United Nations—goes to Formosa to help keep that island out of the hands of Communist China. It goes to Indo-China where 100,000 French troops are fighting side-by-side with the forces of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia against Communist-led forces. It goes to the Philippines and to Thailand to help build forces to insure internal security and discourage outside attack.

The countries we are aiding, and a number of others, are supporting military forces with their own funds. France is supplying the largest part of the military equipment needed in Indo-China and has already spent two billion dollars. Britain is supplying forces which are fighting guerrillas in the Malay States. The substantial military aid we are giving the government of the Republic of Korea is included in the cost of our military services.

**LATIN AMERICA.** In the 1947 treaty of Rio de Janeiro the United States and the other American republics agreed that an armed attack upon one of them is to be regarded as an armed attack on all



and that they would act together for the common defense. Occupying or controlling the approaches to many of the critical military areas and installations in the Western Hemisphere, the Latin American countries constitute an integral part of United States security. They are also the major foreign source for some twenty strategic and critical materials needed for our defense production.

The other American republics are willing to do their share in the common defense and are expanding their land, sea and air forces. Their industrial capacity is very limited, however, and they are unable to produce much modern military equipment and weapons. Their armed forces, in general, are not sufficiently trained or properly equipped to carry any substantial portion of the burden of protecting the hemisphere without our help. Unless we supply them with the needed military equipment to meet important deficiencies and unless we provide adequate training for them to perform their defense tasks, the United States will be called on again—as in World War II—to use its own troops and equipment for such purposes in an emergency.

Under the military grant-aid program the United States expects to conclude bilateral agreements, based on the framework of plans developed in the Inter-American Defense Board, providing for the manner in which various American republics may supply armed forces to handle the defense tasks.

United States military assistance is necessary in Latin America for the readying of forces in these countries for the special hemispheric tasks. Existing United States equipment there needs to be rehabilitated and maintained. Major items of other origins, such as naval vessels, need to be modernized. Additional equipment is needed to fill urgent material shortages. Training in modern techniques and tactics is needed. The program will bring Latin American armed forces to levels comparable to our own and thereby help those nations safeguard our common defense.

Measured against the mighty odds of Soviet power, the free world has a long way to go in a very short time. Yet our partner nations have taken their stand with us and are hard at work in doing their share. They must and will do more as they grow stronger.

Peace is the goal of the program. Military strength can deter the threat of Soviet world conquest or defeat it wherever it may strike.



U. S. Army Photograph

THE HONORABLE ROBERT A. LOVETT

# **ROBERT A. LOVETT--**

## **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**B**RINGING to the post a record of service in aviation, banking, business and government, the new Secretary of Defense served in the Department of Defense for almost a year as Deputy Secretary before his appointment to succeed The Honorable George C. Marshall.


A native of Huntsville, Texas, Secretary Lovett was educated at Yale University, Harvard Law School and Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.

He early became interested in aviation, joining the Aerial Coast Patrol Unit I in 1916 and receiving his Naval wings in 1917 as an ensign in the United States Naval Reserve Force. He went to France in August 1917 where he won his wings as a French military aviator and established a U. S. Naval Air Service Transition Flying School. He later served with the Royal Air Service and subsequently was named commander of United States Naval Air Squadron I of the Northern Bombing Group. He was awarded the Navy Cross for heroism in World War I.

Mr. Lovett entered the investment business in 1921, later becoming a director in a railroad and in a number of insurance companies.

He joined the Government service as special assistant to the Secretary of War in 1940. A year later he became Assistant Secretary of War for Air in which position he served through World War II and for which activity he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. Under his administration as Assistant Secretary of War for Air the production of long-range bombers in World War II was stepped up enormously to meet the requirements of global war.

From July 1947 to January 1949 he was Under Secretary of State for Secretary Marshall. Mr. Lovett returned to the banking business for two years, but when General Marshall was named Secretary of Defense, he asked Mr. Lovett to serve as Deputy Secretary. He was sworn in as Secretary of Defense on 17 September 1951.



U. S. Army Photograph

## FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Honorable George C. Marshall, who retired 12 September 1951 as Secretary of Defense, compiled an unparalleled record of achievement in the Nation's service. A graduate of Virginia Military Institute, he was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry in 1902 and fought with the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. He directed the United States Army as Chief of Staff during World War II, attaining the rank of General of the Army. In 1945 he went to China as Special Representative of the President, with the personal rank of Ambassador; and in 1947 he was appointed Secretary of State. He proposed the European Recovery Program for the economic rehabilitation of free nations, known as the Marshall Plan, and was instrumental in concluding the Western Hemisphere Mutual Defense Pact. In 1949 he was named president of the American National Red Cross. With his appointment as Secretary of Defense in September 1950, he became the third to hold that post since it was created by the National Security Act of 1947.

## DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A veteran of World War I in which he served as an Army Air Corps aviator, The Honorable William C. Foster was Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration when he was named to the post of Deputy Secretary of Defense. Educated at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he became known after World War I as an expert in problems of small business. He was special representative of the Under Secretary of War on procurement matters for the Army Air Forces during World War II and at the end of the war was director of purchases for the Army Service Forces. For his wartime services he was awarded the Medal for Merit. Returning to the Nation's service from private business, Mr. Foster was named Under Secretary of Commerce in 1946 and two years later he was appointed Deputy United States Special Representative in Europe for the newly created Economic Cooperation Administration. In June 1949 he was appointed Deputy Administrator for ECA and in October 1950 became Administrator. He was sworn in as Deputy Secretary of Defense on 24 September 1951.

Foldenauer Photograph



# SPRING CAMPAIGN IN KOREA

By

CAPTAIN JAMES H. TATE

**T**HE EIGHTH Army—highly trained, highly conditioned and highly confident—kept throwing short, hard jabs at the bigger, slower Communist foe, daring him to launch his spring offensive.

During the first three weeks of April 1951, steady, careful pressure was maintained on the enemy as United Nations forces pushed forward to take the commanding ground in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel. By 9 April they had reached a line extending some 116 miles across the peninsula running north from the tidal water of the Imjin River, then east to include the Hwachon Reservoir and continuing to Yangyang on the east coast.

After reaching this line, United Nations units south of the “iron-triangle” of Chorwon-Pyonggang-Kumhwa launched a limited offensive to disrupt the enemy build-up in this area. By 20 April these attacking forces had reached a predesignated phase line immediately south of the triangle and Eighth Army forces in the center and on the east coast began coming up on line.

To keep pressure on the enemy, the U. S. I and IX Corps on 21 April began to push beyond that phase line while the U. S. X Corps and Republic of Korea (ROK) Army forces prepared to attack. These actions were interrupted by the long-awaited Communist offensive. (For Eighth Army phase lines, see map, page 18.)

## The Fifth Phase Offensive

Forced to counter the steady United Nations offensive action—now under command of General Matthew B. Ridgway, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and General James A. Van Fleet, Eighth Army Commander—the Chinese and North Korean forces began what they termed the Fifth Phase Offensive on Sunday, 22 April. The attack began with heavy artillery barrages in the U. S. I and IX Corps sectors followed by general assaults across the Imjin

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*CAPTAIN JAMES H. TATE, Infantry, is Assistant Public Information Officer, Headquarters, Eighth Army. Previous articles by Captain Tate describing earlier phases of the Korean campaign appeared in the DICEST March and August 1951 issues.*

River, west of the Hwachon Reservoir and north of Inje. Military and news reports coming back to Eighth Army Headquarters late Sunday afternoon echoed the same conclusion, "This is it."

This was the critical action for the opposing forces. After being beaten back from the Chongchon River in December, the Eighth Army had more than recovered. It had become a more professional, effective war machine which throughout the late winter and early spring had severely punished the Communists and seriously disrupted their plans. Now the Eighth was meeting its greatest test.

For the enemy it was a supreme effort to destroy the Eighth Army. When in late November the tide of battle had turned in favor of the Red attackers at the Chongchon River, he had pushed the Eighth Army down the peninsula below Seoul but beyond that could not advance. Winter fighting had bled him of manpower. During late March and April he prepared for his big effort. Now he attacked.

Could the Eighth Army, which had grown stronger over the past months in the fire of battle, now hold the Communist hordes? That the Eighth did hold, and then lashed back in its strongest counter-attack of the war, is history. This is how it was done.

The initial enemy attack hit the ROK 6th Division west of the reservoir and that Division began to withdraw. The enemy then drove a wedge between the two forward regiments of the ROK 6th Division. The Division's reserve regiment moved north to block the penetration



A column of Eighth Army infantrymen crosses Korean rice paddies in an advance toward their objective.

U. S. Army Photograph



but itself became engaged with a strong enemy force and also withdrew. Within 24 hours the Division was 12 to 15 miles south of its original positions, attempting to reorganize. Suffering heavy casualties, it was able to regroup only partially in new positions.

The assault had been launched by the 20th Chinese Communist Army between the U. S. 24th Infantry and 1st Marine Divisions which were holding the shoulders of the enemy salient. But resistance in the area between was negligible and reserve Communist troops poured through toward Kapyong. To counter this threat, the British Commonwealth 27th Brigade and the U. S. 5th Cavalry Regiment rushed up to establish strong positions three miles north of Kapyong. All other units north of the Imjin River line were ordered to withdraw to it.

Late Monday and early Tuesday the enemy smashed at the hastily prepared defense north of Kapyong, trying to exploit the breakthrough and turn the flank of the western half of the Eighth Army line. But the "fluid" situation on command post battle maps slowly began to crystallize as United Nations forces stalled the enemy thrust. By 26 April, the penetration had for the most part been contained.

To the west, the enemy struck his heaviest blows across the Imjin against units of the U. S. I Corps. Here the defense action was marked by such achievements as the stand of the ROK 1st Division, the miraculous escape from entrapment of the Belgium-Luxembourg Battalion and the heroic fight and tragic fate of the encircled Gloucesters of the British 29th Brigade.

The U. S. I Corps, which withstood every attack, was ordered to withdraw because of the salient on its right flank. It fell back, fighting heavily and adding greater luster to the history of the Eighth Army.

The Communists also launched an attack north of Inje against the ROK 5th Division. The ROK unit was shifting to the west when it was hit by elements of the North Korean III and V Corps. The resulting confusion and enemy pressure caused the friendly forces to withdraw on 23-24 April. When the withdrawal had been completed the enemy penetration was halted, although harassing pressure continued.

On 29 April, one week after the Communist offensive began, United Nations forces formed an arc just north of Seoul, due east for 20 miles, then northeast to the coast near Yangyang. United Nations withdrawals had been as much as forty miles.

### The Post-Offensive Lull

Having outstripped the enemy's ability to follow, the Eighth Army was able to move into its new line and set up deliberate defenses. General Van Fleet ordered that this line be maintained and that further withdrawals be made only upon his order.



United States Marines move forward to new positions after knocking out an enemy bunker barring their progress. Marine Corps Photograph

Although United Nations forces were weaker in the eastern half of the line, intelligence indicated that enemy forces in this sector were relatively light and that the main hostile strength was facing the U. S. I Corps. Too, the rugged terrain in the east central mountains offered United Nations units more easily defended positions.

During the last few days of April and the first days of May, Eighth Army patrols searched far to the north for an enemy which had withdrawn to regroup. The first attempt of the Fifth Phase Offensive had failed but the enemy's capabilities were still great. The Eighth had taken an attack by a quarter of a million Communist troops but by a combination of air support, artillery fire and infantry tenacity had inflicted 20,000 enemy casualties and maintained its own line.

To regain contact with the enemy and yet maintain a strong defense line, Eighth Army Headquarters on 3 May ordered each U.S. Corps to establish a patrol base six miles farther north. For the next week, in spite of strong patrols which roamed 10 to 12 miles farther north, contact with the enemy continued light and scattered.

In addition to the need to reestablish contact with the enemy, it was equally essential that a usable main supply road be made available to the ROK forces in the east where the inaccessibility of positions made airdrops and hand-carrying of supplies necessary. To secure such a road the ROK forces attacked on 7 May with the objective of seizing a line north of and parallel to the Hongchon-Kansong road. If the ROK forces held this line, they could be supplied from Kansong.

In coordination with the attack in the east, the ROK 1st Division on the Eighth Army's western flank launched a three-day attack also on 7 May to destroy the enemy. These ROK troops engaged enemy

units up to regimental size, forcing them to withdraw. The enemy in the area gave no indication, at that time, of resuming an offensive.

Meanwhile the Eighth Army attack in the east followed the earlier pattern of steady, methodical advance against typical enemy delaying tactics—stubborn and determined one day and nonexistent the next. Along the east coast where naval gunfire offered support and protection, the ROK I Corps advanced rapidly with practically no opposition and on 9 May units of the ROK 11th Division occupied Kansong. By 10 May the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions in the U.S. X Corps sector were just south of their objectives. Units in the center of the ROK Army were still 10 miles short of the goal.

While these attacks were in progress, enemy contact in the U.S. I, IX and X Corps sectors continued to be negligible.

With the success of the ROK offensive action on the Eighth Army's flanks and the relative absence of the enemy across the entire battlefront, an attack plan was formulated to advance to the Imjin-Hwachon Reservoir line beginning 12 May. On 11 May, however, reports indicated that the enemy forces west of the Pukhan River were massing for an attack within 72 hours. Because the Eighth could best meet and repulse an enemy offensive from its then current positions, the plan was indefinitely postponed.


The massing of enemy troops was not for an attack against the U.S. IX Corps, however. Between 10 and 16 May the Chinese Communist 12th, 15th, 20th, 27th and 60th Armies moved east to the front of the U.S. X and ROK III Corps. On 16 May this enemy force of over 150,000 troops struck United Nations lines south of Inje.

### The Offensive Is Resumed

The heaviest assault hit the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions. While most units held their positions initially, enemy pressure forced them to withdraw on 17 May. During this retrograde movement a gap of two miles formed along the ROK III Corps left flank through which an enemy division flowed to set up a road block at Sangam-ni. This breakthrough blocked the ROK III Corps' main supply road making it necessary to continue to withdraw in this sector. The ROK forces were ordered to do so after destroying the road block.

But before this order could be carried out, the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions, under heavy enemy attack, were withdrawing to the south. Thus, both the right flank of the U.S. 2d Division and the left flank of ROK III Corps were exposed and in danger of envelopment.

The ROK III Corps reformed its left flank and on 18 May the ROK 9th and 3d Divisions began to withdraw. Straggler lines collected fragments of the Corps on the following day and these were hastily



reorganized. But on 21 and 22 May the ROK units were again heavily attacked and their command posts overrun. ROK III Corps became ineffective to such an extent that, on 22 May, it was inactivated. The ROK 8th and 9th Divisions were attached to U.S. X Corps and the ROK 3d Division to ROK I Corps. The U.S. X Corps also assumed responsibility for the former III Corps sector.

Meanwhile, to contain the penetration and to reestablish the United Nations line in this area, the U.S. 3d Division moved from Seoul where it had been in reserve. By 18 May the 15th Regimental Combat Team was in position on the right flank of the U.S. 2d Division and on 20 May the 187th RCT moved into blocking position.

During this period, the U.S. 2d Division had been holding the flank, preventing the enemy from sweeping to the southwest. But on 17 May when the ROK units collapsed, the Division was in peril of being enveloped; added to this, the enemy had been able to establish a road block which cut the Division's main supply road.

At this critical juncture, the 5th Regiment of the U.S. 1st Marine Division relieved the 2d Division's left flank unit—the 9th Regiment—which then launched an attack against the enemy road block from the south. Simultaneously all other units of the U.S. 2d Division (23d and 38th Regiments, French and Dutch Battalions) which were north of the road block drove on it from that direction.

More than 150 vehicles were lost when the "Indianheads" again ran an enemy gauntlet as they had at Kunu-ri in December. But the Division succeeded in establishing a line south of Hangye which stopped the Communists. Prisoners captured in the area declared that their units had the specific mission of destroying the 2d—evidence of the respect the enemy has for the United States division which has inflicted the greatest losses on him.

Between 16 and 20 May the ROK I Corps on the Eighth Army's east flank had executed orderly withdrawals to a line north of the Kangnung-Soksa-ri road. During the same period, units of the U.S. I, IX and X Corps had repulsed attacks of regimental size. But there had been no danger of an enemy breakthrough nor had any withdrawals been necessary.

With the bolstering of the United Nations line in the ROK Army sector by United States units, the enemy himself helped stabilize the situation by reducing his pressure, apparently because of exhaustion, casualties and supply difficulties. By 21 May the enemy had been contained. The second attack of his Fifth Phase Offensive was a failure. His effort had proved costlier than his April offensive although it was confined to a much smaller area. During the four-day attack, the Communists suffered an estimated 36,000 casualties. Of these, slightly



An infantry gun crew fires its 75mm recoilless rifle to blast the enemy from his mountain positions.

U. S. Army Photograph

over half—nearly 19,000—were attributed to the 2d Division. The failure of the enemy's spring double offensive clearly showed that he did not have the power to defeat the Eighth Army nor drive it into the sea. The best he could attain militarily was a stalemate.

### Eighth Army Strikes Back

While the enemy was spent from his offensive effort, the Eighth Army commander seized this opportunity to strike back. A general advance was ordered for the U.S. I, IX and X Corps toward the vital road nets and communications centers near the 38th Parallel in the central sectors, with the mission of trapping the enemy forces now withdrawing from the battle zone.

This counterattack—the first to be launched by the Eighth Army immediately following a Chinese Communist offensive—was pressed with all speed. Rain, mud and enemy delaying action, however, impeded the closing of the escape routes and prevented the complete destruction or seizure of the enemy's supply bases. The Eighth Army inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and disorganized his retreat. By 27 May the 187th RCT had taken Inje and the 17th Infantry Regiment had captured Hwachon.

In summing up the achievements of the week-long United Nations counterattack, General Van Fleet told the press: "The well timed and aggressive United Nations counteroffensive, utilizing artillery and air support to the best advantage, inflicted a terrible toll in killed and



wounded. The battlefields show signs of desperate action and hasty flight—abandoned artillery and heavy equipment as well as discarded personal weapons and equipment. Approximately 10,000 Chinese were captured, some in large groups. And while many showed signs of physical exhaustion as well as ravenous hunger, others were in apparently excellent physical condition and were fully capable of continuing the fight except for realization of the futility of the situation. The toll taken on some units is exemplified by the prisoner reports which reflect 80 to 90 per cent ineffectiveness in some Communist divisions. Concluded, then, is the phase which must be considered as one of the critical battles of the Korean campaign."

During the period 22 to 29 May, the Eighth had inflicted an estimated 43,000 casualties on the enemy. In spite of this success, there was still an opportunity to destroy more enemy forces and materiel. Accordingly, on 27 May a limited offensive was launched, attacking toward three important enemy centers of supply and communication. U.S. I Corps was to take the area between Chorwon and Kumwha. U.S. IX Corps had two objectives, one in the Cholgol area and one in the area north of Hwachon. U.S. X Corps and ROK I Corps were to attack toward a line extending from the east end of the Hwachon Reservoir northeast to the coast.

During the last days of May, the Eighth Army continued its attack toward these objectives. But as it approached the supply centers near Chorwon and Kumhwa and north of Inje, the enemy's resistance increased. He still had ample force both to offer a determined



Army artillerymen load an 8-inch howitzer being used to support the advance of United Nations forces in Korea.

U. S. Army Photograph

defense and to launch a counterattack in spite of the estimated 100,000 losses he had suffered in his 22 April and 16 May offensives and in the 22 May United Nations counteroffensive.

In the face of the enemy's still powerful potential, United Nations forces held back reserve strength. By 1 June the Eighth Army had pushed the enemy north of the 38th Parallel, taken Hwachon and Inje and severed most of the escape routes south of the Hwachon Reservoir. Its swift counteroffensive had, for the first time, forced the enemy into a precipitous withdrawal. The offensive was therefore continued with all possible speed with the mission of cutting still more escape routes and destroying the enemy supplies. These operations, however, were only moderately successful. The enemy stubbornly resisted wherever his supply installations or escape routes were threatened. The Eighth Army was able to advance with comparative ease only in those areas where withdrawal cost the enemy nothing but Korean real estate.

In this fact lies the key to Chinese Communist tactics as opposed to those of the North Koreans. To the North Korean, the land itself is something to hold and he fights for it. To the Chinese, territory is of little consequence except as a means for the destruction of the enemy's army. His tactical doctrine has been to maintain a fluid battle line, to entice his enemy to an over-extension of forces and then to destroy those forces. Withdrawal, therefore, is as important a part of Chinese Communist tactics as the advance.

During this push in the west, the enemy defense consisted of rear-guard actions to protect the evacuation of his supplies. The most stubborn opposition encountered by advancing United Nations units



An infantry force dashes across a field under enemy fire in an attempt to cut off retreating Communists.

U. S. Army Photograph

was along the Uijongbu-Chorwon and Uijongbu-Kumhwa highways where relatively small enemy groups, making good use of favorable terrain, were successful in impeding the progress of much larger United Nations forces. Nevertheless, the Eighth Army continued its methodical inching forward.

On 13 June, Task Force Hawkins from the U.S. 3d Division and Task Force Hamilton from the U.S. 25th Division advanced from Chorwon and Kumhwa, respectively, toward Pyongyang. The two task forces effected a link-up in the city at 1640 hours. Except for a few rounds of mortar fire along the Kumhwa-Pyongyang road, no enemy activity was encountered. It became evident that the enemy had evacuated his supplies and equipment and, in keeping with his tactical doctrine, had relinquished the territory to Eighth Army.

Meanwhile, units in the eastern sector attacked toward the Hwachon Reservoir-Yangyang line. ROK I Corps forces, assisted by naval gunfire, had reached that line by 1 June. However, U.S. X Corps units attacking in the Yanggu and Inje areas encountered stubborn resistance from small but well-entrenched enemy forces. As in the west, the enemy delayed to gain time to evacuate men and supplies. Once this was accomplished, resistance became negligible.

Between 15 and 30 June, the Eighth Army made few changes in its line which ran along the Imjin River, north of Chorwon and Kumhwa, then northeast above Kansong. It was a strong line held by a very strong Army which had turned the two Communist spring bids for victory into defeats.

At the close of a full year of operations, the Eighth could look back on twelve months of fighting which could meet the highest standards of soldiering. It had been a year of many bleak, hard days. It had seen the Army come back twice from seeming defeat. It had seen it almost destroy the North Korean People's Army and severely damage three Chinese field armies. It had proved that the United States Eighth Army could not be forced from Korea by military means.

During this period, 480,000 Chinese troops were killed or wounded and 16,200 captured; 360,000 North Korean troops were killed or wounded and 145,000 captured—an awesome total of over a million casualties.

At this point, the Communist world, unable to defeat the Eighth Army on the field of battle, asked for the opportunity to talk of peace. While the free world listened, the Eighth Army kept its guard up and its powder dry.

# CONSERVATION IS THE KEYNOTE

By

FRANKLIN P. HUDDLE

AN advertising man endeavoring to put across the complicated problems of conservation of men, materiel and money in the present national emergency might come up with a phrase such as "Cold or hot, war costs a lot."

Actually, the net result in either instance is pretty much the same—an impact on the entire economic structure of the Nation, ending in higher costs and in certain shortages of strategic materials. The resulting rising prices, as the Secretary of Defense has pointed out before a Congressional committee, have virtually doubled the costs of many items of military equipment in only one year's time.

War is a great consumer of materials and manpower; whether a hot war or cold war, both are needed in abnormal amounts. The pressure of military requirements has already created serious shortages of many important strategic items. Consequently the military departments have the problem, for a long period ahead, of maintaining maximum preparedness with the least possible drain on the national economy. That means it is essential to practice extreme and rigid conservation.

Full impact of the current preparedness program is yet to come. When orders now being placed are in full production, consumer goods will begin to be pinched off in favor of arms output. To ease this pressure as much as possible the Department of Defense has instituted an intensified program of conservation, together with attempts to increase productive capacity. It also has cushioned the effect by planning its requirements, by spreading contracts and by far-sighted scheduling of production of end items and components.

Latest figures available show that as of 1 October 1951 the productive capacity of the entire country has already been stepped up by at least 12 per cent. Economists and production experts feel that eventually the country's manufacturing potential can be turned into such reality that we can produce sufficient consumer goods to meet

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all ordinary demand and at the same time produce the munitions needed for rearmament.

But even if the production goal is reached, conservation of materials must go on. This enormously complicated job has been allocated to the Munitions Board for coordination. One important activity of this program was the formulation of a policy calling for maximum conservation in military procurement, utilization and disposal activities.

Although the planning and mapping out of a conservation program must of necessity be done at the top level, any such program must take account of the blunt truth that ultimate success depends upon the operational personnel—the shop foreman, the stock clerk, the supply sergeant, the ordnance inspector, workers in military scrap yards, procurement officers, truck drivers, warehouse workers and troops in the field. Without their cooperation, all of the planning, the paper work, memoranda, recommendations, directives and policy statements are of little consequence. Therefore it is of the utmost importance that conservation policy decisions be quickly and systematically translated into workable, understandable and clear-cut programs for operational personnel to carry out.

Conservation is usually thought of as economy and supply discipline. But the Munitions Board recognizes that it is more than that. Conservation is more than a function—it is an attitude, a policy, a way of doing business by resourceful management and efficient utilization. It is everybody's business. All the staff elements of the military departments are involved in it. The Army G4, the Office of Naval Materiel and the Air Materiel Command are actively engaged in developing conservation programs.

Work of these three staff units is closely parallel. It is necessary for them to work together in well-coordinated relationship. In the field of research and development of substitutes, there must be frequent interchange of information and reports.

In this respect there may at times be competition—but there also is cooperation. A research program in the Bureau of Ships may be concerned with the properties and uses of magnesium for construction; but presently the Bureau advises the Munitions Board that it has reached a point in its investigations where it believes there would be value in a review of its findings by the research and development experts in the Army and the Air Force.

Disposal of scrap is a matter of concern to the Army, Navy and Air Force alike. Each Department has developed its own procedures which differ from those of the others. This is not necessarily inefficient—there is no magic in uniformity for its own sake. The Navy,

for instance, converts its aluminum scrap into secondary ingot while the Army and Air Force ship theirs to the commercial smelter. Either operation can be economical and efficient. Each Department is well aware of the way the others conduct the operation and each can learn from them. When there is a divergence of view as to the ways of doing some particular job, the question may come before the Munitions Board for analysis but even then the Board does not insist upon uniformity.

Some problems that could be resolved simply under conditions of all-out war become complicated in the existing circumstances. The Munitions Board must consider whether to substitute immediately materials that would conserve strategic goods but would result in inferior products. During wartime the problem would be simple—proceed with the substitution, as was done in the case of wooden truck bodies instead of steel during World War II. But should this be done at this time? Is it not better to get as many items of high quality built while it is possible, on the grounds that in the long run they give better service and are more economical?

Again, which is more important—high speed steel, tungsten carbide or high-velocity armor-piercing ammunition cores? Should we select a fairly suitable alloy for immediate use or wait six months until we have developed a cheaper and even better one? To what extent should we emphasize durability of construction even at greater cost? Should we design with a view to wartime productivity or to current economy? These are some of the problems faced.

Few of these delicate questions can be solved with a simple yes or no. Every factor must be considered, discussed, weighed. An example comes to mind. Recently the National Production Authority (NPA) called attention of the Munitions Board to a number of military procurement contracts for steel office furniture. The NPA asked whether it would not be better to secure wooden desks in order to conserve steel. Had the country been in an all-out war the answer would have been simple. But today, on what basis should the Department of Defense decide between steel and wood? Steel desks have a slight edge over wooden ones because they do not burn, they give better security protection, they are easier to refinish, they last longer and they actually are slightly cheaper. But steel is in short supply and many grades of lumber are not. Yet no hard and fast regulations exist prohibiting manufacture of steel furniture for civilian use.

In time of war the question would be resolved without particular reference to cost, whereas in peacetime steel desks would have the edge for economy if for nothing else. But right now when both ma-



materials and money must be saved, it is not easy to reach decisions. In this particular case the Munitions Board finally recommended to the services that they offer contract opportunities to manufacturers of both steel and wooden desks; that they encourage a slight shift to wooden items but decide each case on its own merits, bearing the cost factor in mind.

The example of the desks is presented not because of its gravity or importance but as a fairly simple case to describe and one that is typical in essence of the many other problems that arise. In all of these this question must be decided: If several materials will serve equally well as far as performance is concerned, which one should be used? Some materials are in such short supply that great efforts are justified in order to conserve them. The defining of relative scarcity and relative availability of materials is universally recognized as the central problem to be studied. In all such cases the Munitions Board must consider the many aspects involved before a determination is made as to which material should be selected.

Should molybdenum or tungsten be used in high speed steel? Should cobalt or nickel be used to cement tungsten carbide? Should nylon or hog bristles be used in paint brushes? Questions of this sort become the responsibility of the Munitions Board to decide, in consultation with the services requiring the materials, with industry which processes them and with the Defense Production Administration and other Government agencies having an interest in the uses of various types of materials.

The military departments are playing an important part in the conservation program in the three primary functions of planning requirements, scheduling of production of end items and components, and in procurement. In all of these ways the departments are spreading the load of munitions purchasing so that the national economy is affected as little as possible.

In effecting savings through a sound requirements program, the logistics staffs of the three military departments must know well in advance what quantities of which end items can be purchased and, even more important, what quantities cannot. They must plan for the proper time-phasing of the "hard-to-get" items together with the "easy-to-get" so that everything comes together properly. Thus in such a matter as shell production, advance plans must be made so that the primers are ready just when and as needed to complete the shells; or in airplane production, plans must be made so that airframes are not turned out too fast for engine availability. A hundred other examples might be cited.

Further conservation is effected by balanced scheduling of actual

plant facilities. By proper timing, plants can be utilized efficiently without waste of capacity or without the loss resulting from hasty, forced production by overloaded equipment.

In the field of procurement—including inspection, specifications and standardization, packing, transportation, warehousing and distribution—great economies are being realized. Some are achieved by research and development of improved palletting methods (packing for efficiency in stowage, carrying and loading); lighter, more compact packing cases; use of various types of strapping; and design of durable containers for dormant storage. Other economies occur through revised procedures so that less paper is needed to record procurement transactions, thereby saving office time and personnel.

The military departments also are encouraged to search for and to use substitutes for critical materials. Many new high-temperature alloys which appear to promise substantial reduction in use of scarce materials, such as columbium and cobalt, now are being tested. One significant result has been accelerated development work by aircraft manufacturers which has so far brought about substitution of titanium-stabilized stainless steel for the columbium-stabilized type previously required in the jet alloy program. Search is also being made for substitutes for tungsten in ordnance applications, high-purity zinc in die-casting, top quality waterproof adhesives, sulfuric acid, nickel, molybdenum and a number of others.

An important contribution to conservation is the development of a screening and analysis system for military requirements. Here the Munitions Board cooperates with the National Production Authority to cross-check military end-item schedules with melting schedules—that is, production data—supplied by industry to identify the principal items consuming raw materials. All data are carefully screened and then analyzed by teams of military personnel and NPA staff members to eliminate excessive and non-essential uses of critical and strategic materials.

When an acute shortage of wool fiber developed, the Department of Defense announced, in April 1951, a four-part conservation program for wool. This included broadening of specifications to permit acceptances of lower grades; adoption of lighter weight fabrics in both wool and worsted; increased use of reprocessed and re-used woolen goods; and substitution of synthetic and other fibers where and as practical.

This program, which has for its goal a 15 per cent reduction in military requirements for new wool, is expected to enable the departments to make maximum use of materials produced in the United States and to reduce our dependence on imported wool.

So the fight goes on to save where possible and keep down the cost of the cold war. It is not as simple a job as it appears when first stated. It entails broad and far reaching policy decisions, based upon careful analysis of dozens of factors, which are complicated rather than simplified by the fact that the Nation is not actually in a full-scale war. The attitude that prevailed during the height of World War II, when all manner of substitutes (some good and some bad) were resorted to on a "for the duration" basis, is not appropriate now. We cannot be satisfied with the poor makeshifts which were used during that emergency period. Nor can we any longer justify a military demand for top quality standards that were established when materials were available in unlimited supply. Today the policy of the Department of Defense, in view of the long tough road ahead, must be based upon designs, specifications and standards that will do the best possible job with the least drain on our resources of money, materials and manpower. This is of great importance to every member of the Armed Forces. There is no aspect of the cold war that deserves higher priority.

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By proper time-phasing of our call up of manpower with the scheduling of production, we greatly cushion the inevitable impact on the civilian economy. It is our policy to call men into active service only as rapidly as we have the equipment they need. We don't want undershirts before we have soldiers; we don't want the wheels of the truck before we have the chassis. We are time-phasing the hard-to-get with the easy-to-get, the short lead time items with the long lead time items. We want to receive the things we must have at the time we must have them—not earlier than needs be and not later.

*General John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army*



U. S. Navy Photograph

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# AIRSHIPS HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY

By

CAPTAIN GEORGE F. WATSON

FOR a brief thirty seconds, a telltale pip on the radar screen indicated a tapered silhouette on the surface of the rain-splashed, white-capped sea a thousand feet below. The radar observer in the big silver United States Navy blimp continued probing through the murky gloom of the late afternoon rain squall but now the image had disappeared. He unglued his eyes from the scope and reported tersely, "Unidentified radar contact disappeared from screen."

The second pilot swung hard on the rudder control to bring the blimp over to the right. Quickly the command pilot issued instructions to the radio operator in the car behind him and simultaneously sounded the alarm bell that sent the entire crew to battle quarters.

By the time the blimp, wallowing in the fitful gusts of the storm, reached what the navigator judged was the spot where the radar contact had disappeared—the very disappearance indicated that it must be a hostile submersible since no friendly subs were in the area—responses to the alert were beginning to come in by radio. Attack bombers were en route from a carrier. Two destroyers were on the way.

Now it was the blimp's job to locate the submersible accurately, to determine its course if it were attempting a get-away and to mark that course for the killer bombers and surface craft. The second pilot swung the rudder to take the big airship on a "hunter circle"—very much like a hound dog trying to pick up a lost scent. The first pilot wrestled with the elevator controls to keep the big airship on an even keel. The navigator stood behind the electronics board watching the radar man. The command pilot listened with headphones for radio contact reports while he scanned the sea with binoculars. The second rigger was on the machine gun platform just over the pilots' heads. Up in the nose of the car a crewman crouched with his hands on the bomb control. Farther back another crewman placed a flare in one of two extending tubes and a sonobuoy in the other.

The crewman at the tubes tripped a lever and the flare hurtled down to light up the ocean. A second later the sonobuoy shot down and began sending out signals to guide the bombers and destroyers.

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Now began a game of hide and seek. In a few minutes the blimp's electronic devices showed another trace of the craft—this time a quarter mile away in a southeasterly direction. Two more flares were dropped. From the position and spacing of the three flares, the bomber crews were able to judge the course and speed of the submarine. They calculated its probable location and dropped half a dozen depth bombs in a wide pattern.

The blimp continued tracking, its delicate electronic instruments now indicating that the submarine was stationary. Soon a pair of destroyers converged on the scene, made a run and picked up indications of a submersible on their instruments. They dropped powerful depth charges and another "kill" officially was chalked up.

This all happened recently in Atlantic Fleet maneuvers. The bombs and depth charges, of course, were not armed since the submarines that took part in the exercises were our own. In every other respect, however, the situation duplicated actual combat operations, bringing into play the latest devices and techniques perfected since the hunter-killer submarine tactics were worked out in World War II.

Today the employment of blimps in antisubmarine activities is growing more important because the development of the *sch snorkel*—a valve-like device that enables the submarine to "breathe" while lying concealed beneath the surface—has made detection of submarines continually more difficult. So equipped, the submersible can remain under water for days at a time. The use of lighter-than-air craft which can sweep large areas by visual and instrument observation is one of the Navy's answers to the submarine challenge.

The operation described, while typical of an actual maneuver, is not the only pattern of attack. In periods of good visibility, dyes are used instead of flares to mark the course of the enemy craft. Or a sonobuoy pattern—consisting of floating electronic instruments which send out continuing radio beams—may be used to transmit signals for hours to bombers and surface craft. By use of these devices, the blimp need not even stay to keep watch but may take off to hunt for another indicated submarine many miles away.

Sometimes the enemy marauder is discovered by the detecting devices of a surface craft; but the submarine's own hearing devices indicate danger, so it stops. Blimps are then called in to pinpoint it with magnetic detectors. Sometimes from their overhead vantage point the blimp crews are able to discern with unaided eye the shape of the sub beneath the surface.

Sometimes, too, one of the swifter heavier-than-air craft on patrol duty may detect a submarine but will lose the trace because its speed makes it difficult to engage in actual detection. Again the blimp comes



into play and locates the enemy. Then the bombers close in with their lethal weapons.


The blimp serves primarily in detection work—the hunter aspect of the antisubmarine tactics. But these big engine-driven gas-bags are capable of carrying a certain amount of armament for attack. Present training emphasizes the offensive use of bombs, .50 caliber machine guns and even torpedoes which can be launched from low flying hovering blimps. Training in offensive methods, in fact, is very much a part of the everyday work of the blimp crews.

Just prior to the United States entry in World War II, the Navy had some half dozen blimps and only about 200 trained specialists in this field. But with the German submarine wolf packs sinking ships faster than they could be replaced in 1942 and with 5000 miles of sea frontier to be patrolled, the Navy recalled the success of lighter-than-air craft in World War I. The Congress authorized the building of 200 such ships and by 1945 there were 14 squadrons flying convoy and escort duty in the Atlantic and Pacific, covering the Caribbean out of Jamaica and Trinidad and the South Atlantic out of Brazil. American airships covered the Mediterranean also. Incidentally, the airships of one of these squadrons were the first non-rigids ever to make a trans-oceanic flight. At the peak of operations, these airships patrolled some 3,000,000 square miles. In all they escorted 89,000 ships in 55,900 operational flights, putting in 550,000 hours in the air.

The submarine pack recognized the threat of the airships too, because their field of operations was at once pushed out to sea beyond the normal range of the patrolling blimps. No vessel was lost in any convoy attended by blimps during World War II and only one blimp was lost through enemy action. Altogether, of the airships assigned to fleet units, 87 per cent were "on the line," in operation or in readiness for operation at all times, which is a record "availability factor" for military aircraft.


During World War II blimps were used in air-sea rescue work and shipping control. They directed mine sweeping vessels, aided in the salvaging of experimental and training torpedoes (which are expensive things to lose) and of crashed planes in isolated areas. They provided radar calibration for both ships and shore stations and served as mobile observation platforms in spotting navigational hazards such as floating wrecks. They had scores of other uses too, in photography and weather observation.

Sea-to-airship rescue technique has been so perfected that it now is possible to haul survivors directly into the airship car. The blimps can put crewmen down too, where even helicopters cannot reach, as in dense jungles. On one occasion blimp crews salvaged an entire



A mobile mooring mast anchors the blimp securely.

U. S. Navy Photograph



A blimp takes shape as helium is pumped in.

U. S. Navy Photograph

wrecked airplane from the Brazilian jungle. Blimps also are credited with locating and saving hundreds of survivors of sunken ships.

The history of lighter-than-air (LTA) craft goes back far beyond the dawn of aviation. In 1782 two French brothers named Montgolfier, proprietors of a prosperous paper business, were experimenting with some of their merchandise. They found that a paper bag filled with heated air would rise to the ceiling. They first used their new toy to perform parlor tricks but soon enlarged their balloons to carry aloft livestock and finally, two daring men.

The use of balloons as instruments of war was suggested by imaginative military men but because of difficulties in controlling direction of flight, nothing much came of these ideas. During the Civil War, Federal troops used balloons for observation purposes. The young Count von Zeppelin, a German army officer acting as observer with the Union Army, became intensely interested in the possibilities of controlling the flight of balloons. When he retired in 1891 he began developing the new type of airship and produced his first model in 1900. In the next two decades he built many more of the famed Zeppelins. Today, as a reminder of its early origins, United States Navy airship squadrons are designated by the letter ZP.

The Zeppelins were a rigid type of airship—that is, the envelope surrounded a light steel or aluminum framework. World War I brought about a rapid development in lighter-than-air craft as the Germans sought to exploit this means of bombing England. From 1914 to 1918 the Germans built 33 of these ships, ranging up to more than two million cubic feet in size. After the war commercial air service was begun across the North Atlantic. The famed *Hindenburg*, the best known of this type, exploded at Lakehurst in May 1937. Other disasters to several rigid ships, among them the Navy's *Shenandoah* and *Los Angeles*, halted further efforts in this field. The Navy, however, continued experimenting with the non-rigid type.

A great advantage that the United States holds in development of lighter-than-air craft is our near monopoly on helium, a nonexplosive gas, for lifting power. After the *Hindenburg* explosion and fire, Hitler tried to obtain helium stocks "for peaceful purposes only" but the United States refused to supply him.

Much of the Navy's LTA activity centers at the Naval Air Station at Lakehurst, New Jersey, known throughout the world as the "American Airship Center." Construction of the original hangar, largest in the world at the time, was completed in 1921. Today the station serves as headquarters for the Chief of Naval Airship Training and Experimentation (CNATE). Besides being the operating base for two Fleet Airship Squadrons and a Helicopter Utility Squadron, it

conducts schools for both officers and enlisted men and is the home of the Navy Parachute Rigger's School and Aerographer's School.

Training of airship crews is carried on intensively by two squadrons at Lakehurst; two at Weaverville, North Carolina; and one at Key West, Florida (including a detachment at Glynnco, Georgia).

Under a program started four years ago, pilots and crewmen are secured on an exchange basis from trained personnel in heavier-than-air (HTA) flying units, thus reducing the training time from eight months to three months. These new pilots, most of them coming direct from pilot training at Pensacola, go into LTA squadrons for two years. Because they have already been thoroughly trained in aerodynamics, flight theory and other fundamentals, there are practically no washouts at Lakehurst. Aviation rated men attend non-pilot school where they are trained as aviation machinist's mates, structural mechanics and specialists.


Pilots receive 180 hours of ground training and 250 hours of flying while at Lakehurst. They get refreshers in such subjects as aerodynamics, power plants, instruments, electronics, materiel and operation. They take up in detail the new subject of aerostatics, the study of what keeps the ships up and what makes them fly.

As part of their training the pilots study the free balloon, which has not changed in principle since the days of the Montgolfiers. Free balloon flights are made because, should a blimp's engines break down or run out of fuel, the craft then becomes a free balloon with all of its characteristics and problems of pilotage.

Each pilot student makes solo flights but, unlike HTA craft, the pilot does not fly the big craft by himself. One man operates the rudder controls while another handles the elevator controls. In taking off or landing in a heavy wind or bad weather, the elevator man must work hard to supplement the automatic steering devices.

A blimp crew normally consists of four officers and six enlisted men. The enlisted team includes a radio man, radarman, rigger and assistant, and mechanic and assistant. Following training at Lakehurst the crew is assigned to one of the operating squadrons. Then comes still more training designed to develop them as a team and to fit them into that larger team of air-sea operations. This includes almost daily flights to learn tactical maneuvers and techniques of carrier landings.

In the recent Atlantic maneuvers, blimps were aloft night and day with the fleet. A blimp can now make a carrier landing, change crews and be up again in a matter of minutes. One recently remained in the air with the same crew for 170 hours and still had enough fuel left for another 10 or 15 hours of cruising. The latest type ship now



A Lakehurst group studies a mooring mast model.

U. S. Navy Photograph



After a sonobuoy is launched from the blimp, it remains floating on the surface of the sea and emits electronic signals.

U. S. Navy Photograph

being tested by the Navy has sleeping quarters for the crew; and by refueling from a carrier or other surface craft, it can theoretically remain aloft indefinitely. The engines of this new ship are installed inboard so that repairs can be made while aloft.

Landing is again a job of teamwork. The blimp is brought in at a low rate of speed—little more than a walk. Ground men grab trailing lines and the reverse pitch propellers bring the ship to a stop. The crew then moors it to a landing mast. In cases of emergency, blimps have been known to hover motionless while one of the crewmen jumps out and summons help to pull in the lines.

The crews get a thorough training in dropping bombs, launching torpedoes and firing the machine gun at surface targets. Each crew must perform operations that simulate the stalking of a submarine—making a tracking run, dropping sonobuoys, tracing the craft's underwater course by electronic devices, dropping dye-slicks or flares to trace the course, making bombing runs and firing the machine gun at targets. They also get considerable experience in aerial photography. All pilots and both the riggers must be able to handle a camera.

Airships used for preliminary training of pilots are the small G and L type trainers. During World War II larger K type ships were produced. These and the new M type are used for advanced crew training. The K and M ships have a cruising speed of about 50 knots. The M ship, 312 feet long, has a 117-foot car and its envelope has a capacity of 725,000 cubic feet. Power is supplied by two engines with reversible pitch propellers. The new N type ship now undergoing tests has a capacity of about 875,000 cubic feet of gas and its 89-foot car has an upper deck for crew quarters. All of the ships have electronic devices for locating and tracking surface and underwater craft and are equipped with Loran (long range navigation system).

At any of the Naval Air Stations housing LTA squadrons, are signs that cause the visiting motorist to look in some amazement as his foot automatically seeks the brake pedal—"Airships Have the Right of Way." When the visitor witnesses a big ship coming in for a landing with its lines trailing across the roadway, or when he finds the road ahead blocked by a silver blimp being hauled on a mobile mooring mast to the huge hangars, he understands what is meant.

It is the boast and slogan of airship squadrons that, during World War II, "They Were Dependable." All planning and training is carried on with the purpose of keeping them so in any future combat operations. And this time enemy submarine commanders too, will have to heed that road sign—"Airships Have the Right of Way."



# THESE ALIENS ALSO SERVE

By

COLONEL JOE C. LAMBERT

SOMETHING new is being added to the United States Army—the enlistment of aliens from outside the United States. It took an Act of Congress (Public Law 597—81st Congress) to make this innovation possible, for since 1894 such enlistments of foreign born have been prohibited unless the would-be soldier was already an American citizen or had filed a legal intention to become one.

The first group sworn in recently at Sonthofen, Germany, became the vanguard of 2500 non-resident aliens who will be recruited from the thousands of European male applicants who are either displaced persons, exiles or for other reasons can never be repatriated. Under the Department of the Army directive implementing this program, Germans and nationals of countries included in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are specifically excluded.

Assume as typical of the entire group of potential enlistees the case of the hypothetical John Doe. A young man, he was once a loyal citizen of a European country—it could be any one of half a dozen or more that have been swallowed up in the aftermath of war and no longer exist as independent political entities. Doe and thousands of others like him fled his native land and can never go back. He found refuge in the United States Zone of Germany. Whether he be a displaced person, a stateless person, or an exile, his status for the purposes of this story is the same.

Doe first heard of the proposal to enlist aliens nearly a year ago and he began inquiring about it. He found that under the new law the Army was authorized to enlist a small group of male aliens between 18 and 35 years of age, without dependents, who were willing to serve in the United States Army for five years. They would take the enlistment oath in Germany but would go to the United States for basic training and integration in regular Army units. On honorable discharge—and provided also that they possess other necessary quali-

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Alien enlistees arrive at a processing center in Germany, first step toward service with the United States Army.

U. S. Army Photograph



Europeans, some of the first to join the United States Army, try on their new combat boots.

U. S. Army Photograph

fications for citizenship—these men would be regarded as having been legally admitted to the United States, the first step in gaining actual citizenship.

Doe learned that centers for distribution of application forms had been set up at military posts in the United States Zone of Germany at Augsburg, Berlin, Bremerhaven, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Munich, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Wetzlar and Würzburg. At these centers, classification teams consisting of one officer and two enlisted men were on duty to interview and screen applicants. To insure uniformity in testing and interviewing, the classification personnel had previously undergone training at a special school in Langgries, Germany, conducted by Headquarters, European Command.

The Frankfurt center was the one most convenient to the town where Doe was living. There he filled out a form with information concerning his education, past employers, types of work performed, military service if any, language qualifications and—extremely important—the names of organizations of any type with which he had ever been associated or affiliated. The application form was turned over to the testing and interviewing team for study and investigation and Doe was told to return to his home. If eligible for further consideration, he would be notified by letter to report for processing and would be furnished Government rail transportation to the place of interview.

Later his application was reviewed by the testing board at Frankfurt Military Post. His past military experience, his knowledge of English and his chemistry schooling weighed in his favor. Accordingly, he was notified to return to Frankfurt for language and mental tests. Under the implementing regulations he had to possess sufficient mental capacity and understanding of the English language to absorb training and perform military duty. He also was given a cursory physical check. When he had passed all of the tests he was further questioned and interviewed to be certain that he represented the type of individual desired under strict interpretation of the alien enlistment law.

After this careful preliminary screening, Doe's original application was forwarded to security authorities at EUCOM Headquarters in Heidelberg, central clearance point for those who pass the test and interview phase. His background, conduct, past affiliations and all other available data were closely checked but no unfavorable information was uncovered.

Doe was thereupon furnished rail travel orders to proceed to the 7720th Replacement Depot at Sonthofen in southern Germany where he was given a final-type physical examination.

Together with others who had survived the rigid examinations and screenings, Doe took the oath and became a member of the United States Army, unassigned, with the pay, allowances and benefits prescribed for his grade of private, E-1. He received his clothing issue and was furnished messing and housing accommodations—the same as those provided for any United States citizen who had just enlisted. He was given elementary military training and indoctrination while waiting for assignment to a group of other alien enlistees who soon would be on their way to the United States.

Upon arrival in the United States and after being processed at a reception center, Doe will be integrated into the existing training system in the same manner as any other enlistee. He will undergo the 16-week basic training in one of the training divisions or replacement centers in the Zone of Interior. During this period he will receive off-duty instruction in such subjects as American History, Citizenship and English—all designed to enable him to perform his Army job and to become a useful citizen at the termination of his five-year enlistment.

After completing basic and individual training, the new soldier will be assigned to a regularly established unit in accordance with existing policies, procedures and regulations which apply to all personnel enlisting in the Army.

This recruitment processing is being implemented throughout the United States Zone of Germany where at present there are about 10,000 young men who can meet the initial qualifications. However, since there are some 100,000 displaced persons in other parts of Western Germany, the manpower pool may be augmented by eligible males from that group. Under present EUCOM regulations governing enlistments, however, applications will be considered only from individuals who are physically within the United States Zone. Labor Service Unit personnel employed by the United States Army but working outside the Zone are exempted from this requirement. They may file applications through their unit commanders.

With the recent enactment of Public Law 51—82d Congress, the recruitment of 10,000 more men was authorized and the final enlistment date was extended until 30 June 1955. These provisions have not yet been implemented.

Meanwhile John Doe and the others of the first group selected will have become fully trained soldiers. What the Army holds in store for these new European recruits depends to a great extent on themselves and their ability to fit into the ranks as soldiers and eventually as citizens of the United States.

# ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY TRAINING

By

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN T. LEWIS

This is the second of two articles on The Artillery School. The first article, "Fire Power Is Big Business," appeared in the October DIGEST.—*Editor.*

WITH the introduction of aircraft into modern warfare in World War I a need arose for new type weapons capable of protecting the ground soldier from observation and possible attack from the air. Upon development, these weapons—unique because they require a relatively rapid rate of fire and high muzzle velocity—were classified as artillery.

The first United States Army Antiaircraft Artillery School was established in Arnouville, La Gonnese, France, in 1917. In the same year the first antiaircraft courses were added to the school curriculum at Fort Monroe, Virginia, the home of "The Artillery Corps" since 1824. In the two decades after World War I, the Antiaircraft Artillery Section of the Artillery Corps receded into obscurity. However, beginning in 1939 and extending through the initial phases of World War II, the air power demonstrated by the enemy over Great Britain brought realization to the American people and to the United States Army that the advancement of antiaircraft artillery tactics was of prime importance.

The need for a military service school, the entire instructional program of which could be directed toward the development of antiaircraft specialists, became critical early in 1942. In March of that year antiaircraft artillery was eliminated from the academic schedule of the Coast Artillery School where it had been previously taught. In keeping with its new importance, the activity was established as a major combat arm with instructional facilities at the Antiaircraft Artillery School, Camp Davis, North Carolina. In September 1944 the School was moved to Fort Bliss, Texas; and in November 1946, in conjunction with the armed services integration program, the School was made a component of The Artillery School, Fort Sill,

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The Antiaircraft and Guided Missile Branch offers training in highly specialized radar equipment.

U. S. Army Photograph



Students learn the operation of complex instruments which they will employ in the field.

U. S. Army Photograph



Oklahoma, and designated as the Antiaircraft and Guided Missile (AA and GM) Branch.

Today a leading center for instruction in antiaircraft artillery and guided missiles, the AA and GM Branch has the mission of instructing officers and enlisted personnel of the Artillery and other arms and services (including small groups of selected officers and enlisted personnel from Allied nations) in the tactics and techniques of the employment of antiaircraft artillery and guided missiles. It also prepares training literature, presents advice or recommendations on weapons, equipment, organization and research pertaining to antiaircraft artillery and guided missiles, and maintains liaison with field units to insure that the doctrine taught is abreast with latest developments in the field and that units in turn are acquainted with the latest doctrine emanating from the School.

Operating as a unit of the AA and GM Center, the School is organized in five departments of resident instruction and one department of non-resident instruction. These departments are: Tactics, Gunnery and Materiel, Electronics, Guided Missiles, General Subjects, and Non-Resident Instruction.

*The Tactics Department* provides instruction in tactics and techniques used by antiaircraft artillery. Associated subjects, such as coordination between antiaircraft artillery and other branches of the military establishment with which antiaircraft artillery may work, are also taught. By familiarization with Infantry, Field Artillery, Armor and Air Force tactics, the student gains an understanding of the broad tactical picture instead of confining his knowledge strictly to the employment of antiaircraft artillery.

*The Gunnery and Materiel Department* is divided into five sections—Light Antiaircraft Gunnery, Heavy Antiaircraft Gunnery, Surface Gunnery, New Developments, and Enlisted Specialists. Each of the first four sections is responsible for instruction planning and firing of its appropriate weapons. The Light Gunnery Section is concerned with the .50 caliber machine gun, 40mm automatic weapons and the new 75mm Skysweeper—all designed for use against low-flying and intermediary targets. The Heavy Gunnery Section has training jurisdiction over the 90mm and 120mm guns used against high-flying targets, while all types of antiaircraft weapons which may be converted to "ground support" come under the Surface Gunnery Section. The New Developments Section is charged with instruction in and firing of all newly developed equipment. In this role, it works closely with Army Field Forces Board Number 4, the field testing organization operating at Fort Bliss. The Enlisted Specialists Section instructs in maintenance and operation of Antiaircraft Artillery materiel.



Firing 120mm guns is part of the practical instruction given on the Fort Bliss antiaircraft range.

U. S. Army Photograph

A course for Antiaircraft Artillery master gunners and operations chiefs is given by the Heavy Gunnery Section and includes such subjects as mathematics, surveying, drafting, gunnery, meteorology and engineering. The men who do much of the emergency mapping and orientation of guns and equipment during the setting up of firing positions in battle are graduates of this course.

*The Electronics Department* is responsible for instruction in maintenance of all radar equipment used by crews of the ground forces. Electronics, including radar, plays a large part in Antiaircraft Artillery—radar for location of targets and laying of equipment; electronics in the operation of radio, telephone, teletype and similar communications equipment. In the Basic Electronics Section, students receive instruction in radio and electrical mathematics, basic electricity, basic radio, electronics, radar circuits, and the functions and use of electronic equipment and parts. The Communications Section instructs in wire and radio code procedures, antiaircraft communication nets, operation of new equipment, and maintenance.

*The Guided Missiles Department* was added to the School in 1946 and today such terms as aerodynamics, propulsion, damage analysis, maneuverability, thermodynamics and atmospheric jets are common to students in this Department. Complex mathematical formulae on the advanced college level are employed in the classroom where students work at solving the problems posed by this new military

weapon. Here the various guidance and control systems and steering and stability components are studied; and methods of training and tactics for employment of guided missiles are analyzed. Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force officers also are trained in this Department to prepare for defense against such weapons.

*The General Subjects Department* trains students in such fields as Methods of Instruction, Administration, Military Law and Movement by Air. The wide variety of subjects requires many instructors of diversified experience.

*The Department of Non-Resident Instruction* has wide influence in the reserve components. Recognizing that Reserve and National Guard officers have only limited time to prepare instruction and that frequently these officers do not have access to all the necessary source materials, the Department prepares schedules of instruction, suggested references and even the manuscripts for lectures which are then mailed for their use. One of the important non-resident courses—guided missile fire control maintenance—is designed to train selected enlisted personnel to employ, operate, adjust and maintain guided missile fire control systems and associated identification equipment. The Department also prepares all extension courses and technical and field manuals pertaining to antiaircraft artillery and guided missiles and coordinates the preparation of training films as well.

Groups of officers, known as technical instruction teams, actually take the training to students in the field. The teams travel to units in the United States and overseas where they keep instruction up to date by teaching personnel the latest techniques. In this way, the lessons learned in Korea are being passed to other theaters and to students at the School. Combat veterans on the faculty, both officers and enlisted men, incorporate in their instruction the practical knowledge that was developed on the battlefields. In addition, observers from the School have been sent to Korea to seek specific operational data that should be included in the courses. Thus the effects of the School are felt wherever antiaircraft artillerymen serve.

The efforts of all five instructional departments and supporting activities are molded and guided by the Assistant Commandant toward the primary aim of The Artillery School—to produce the best-trained artillerymen in the world. As a major component of The Artillery School, the Antiaircraft and Guided Missile Branch is contributing its part toward this end.

## COURSES AT THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL, ANTIAIRCRAFT AND GUIDED MISSILE BRANCH

### Officer Courses

The following six major courses of instruction are open to officer students:

*Guided Missiles.* A 32-week course in fundamentals, tactics and techniques of guided missiles, including instruction in aerodynamics, propulsion and launching methods, guidance control systems, damage analysis, and study of the role that guided missiles may be expected to assume in ground, sea and air warfare. Additional instruction is offered in mechanics and ballistics, electronics and methods of instruction. Open to officers of all three services.

*Antiaircraft Artillery Associate Battery Officer Course.* A 15-week review of antiaircraft materiel and techniques, including instruction in heavy and light antiaircraft gunnery and materiel, tactics, communications, radar, guided missiles and general subjects. Open to officers of the reserve components and to officers detailed to antiaircraft duties from other arms. Provides refresher training for battery grade officers whose anticipated or actual assignments include duty as gun or automatic weapons unit commanders.

*Artillery Officer Advance Course.* A 44-week course in tactical doctrines, including infantry, field artillery, antiaircraft artillery and combined arms tactics and the employment of artillery weapons in operational warfare. Other instruction given in heavy and light antiaircraft artillery gunnery and materiel, field artillery gunnery and materiel, electronics, guided missiles and general subjects. Designed to provide for selected officers advanced branch training in the duties and responsibilities appropriate to field grade artillery officers. Antiaircraft and Field Artillery officer students receive identical instruction. The first 12 weeks of instruction, given at Fort Sill, deals with employment of the combined arms, basic field artillery gunnery and materiel, staff functions, and other general subjects. During the next 8 weeks students receive instruction at Fort Bliss on antiaircraft artillery gunnery and materiel, electronics and guided missiles. The final 24 weeks are devoted to intensified integrated instruction at Fort Sill.

*Antiaircraft Artillery Officer Associate Advance Course.* A 15-week course in antiaircraft principles and tactics, including the study of electronics, heavy and light antiaircraft gunnery, guided missiles, methods of instruction and movement by air. Designed primarily for antiaircraft officers of the reserve components who volunteer to attend, and regular officers of other branches.

*Antiaircraft Fire Control System, T33 Familiarization Course.* A 20-week course in the operation, maintenance and repair of the antiaircraft fire control system, T33. This newly established course open to officers qualified in the principles of operation, repair and maintenance of SCR-584 or similar radar.

*Artillery Fire Control System Course.* A 31-week course in mathematics, electricity, general electronics, fundamentals of electronic fire control circuits, function, technical operation, characteristics, maintenance, uses and inspection of a basic fire control system. Instruction also covers tactical employment, orientation and synchronization, air defense grids, rawin, jamming and anti-jamming, burst spotting, preparation and interpretation of clutter and coverage diagrams, evaluation of site, emplacement and march order, and methods of instruction. Designed to provide a working knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of artillery fire control equipment staff officers.

In addition to these six principal course offerings, four-week refresher courses are conducted for antiaircraft artillery battery officers, antiaircraft artillery field officers, radar officers and T33 range officers. Designed primarily for artillery officers entering on periods of active duty, these refresher courses review the use and employment of antiaircraft artillery and the principles of technical operation and maintenance of radar and associated equipment. A four-week transition course is offered for officers having little or no experience in antiaircraft artillery.

### Enlisted Courses

The instructional program for enlisted specialists provides training in major Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) of the Artillery career field. This program has been implemented recently to include courses covering guided missile guidance, guided missile maintenance, antiaircraft artillery weapons maintenance, antiaircraft artillery gunnery control, antiaircraft artillery operations chief, T33 familiarization, T33 operations, and Skysweeper employment and gunnery. These courses are open to qualified enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force and to soldiers of the National Guard and Enlisted Reserve Corps who volunteer to attend.

Following are the major courses and the recommended MOS upon successful completion:

*Light Antiaircraft Artillery Mechanic (MOS 4833).* A 7½-week course in organizational maintenance of unit small arms and antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons.

*Heavy and Medium Antiaircraft Artillery Mechanic (MOS 4834).* A 7½-week course in organizational maintenance of unit small arms and heavy and medium antiaircraft guns.

*Fire Control Electrician, Automatic Weapons (MOS 3633).* A 10-week course in fire control operations of antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons units, with emphasis on automatic weapons gunnery and materiel.

*Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Chief (MOS 1724) and Antiaircraft Artillery Gunnery Control (MOS 2671).* An 18-week course in mathematics, surveying, engineering drawing, map reading and orientation, gunnery, methods of instruction and tactics. Trains selected enlisted men to assist the operations officer in the establishment of fire control orientation data or to serve as the principal enlisted assistant in an antiaircraft artillery operations section.

*Guided Missile Electronic Guidance Specialist (MOS 3354).* A 32- to 37-week course designed to train selected enlisted personnel to assemble, install, maintain, and adjust on-missile electronic guidance control components, and associate electronic test equipment used in surface-to-air and surface-to-surface guided missiles. The course includes the study of mathematics, electricity, electronic fundamentals, on-missile electronic guidance system and auxiliary test equipment, and associated ground control and launching equipment.

*Guided Missile Maintenance (MOS 3353).* A 26-week course in mathematics, electricity, machine shop work, on-missile mechanical and hydraulic systems, auxiliary test equipment, and associated propulsion, launching and handling equipment. Designed to train selected enlisted personnel to assemble, install, maintain, and adjust all mechanical and hydraulic on-missile guidance control components, the overall propulsion system and associated test equipment used in surface-to-air and surface-to-surface guided missiles.

*Artillery Fire Control System Specialists (MOS 1775 and 2634).* Designed to train selected enlisted personnel to employ, operate, adjust and maintain artillery fire control equipment, associated IFF radio equipment and radar.

# THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY IN KOREA

By

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CHARLES T. McNAIR

**T**HIRTY-SIX days after the opening shots of the Korean war were fired, three Canadian destroyers steamed into a large naval base in southern Japan to lend their small but effective fire power to the growing United Nations armada.

On 25 June 1950, the day the North Korean Reds swarmed over the 38th Parallel, His Majesty's Canadian Ships *Cayuga*, *Sioux* and *Athabaskan* were secured at the naval base at Esquimalt, British Columbia, preparing for an extended cruise to European ports. They were to join other Canadian naval ships from Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada's naval base on the Atlantic seaboard. Ten days later, their European sailing orders changed, the three ships were steaming for Pearl Harbor with a full war complement of men and ammunition. By 30 July they entered the large United Nations naval base at Sasebo, Japan, and within 24 hours they were at sea on operational duty under the Commander, Naval Forces Far East.

Sasebo had already assumed a United Nations atmosphere when the Canadians put briefly into port. Along with ships of the United States Navy were units of Britain's Royal Navy. Also on the scene or on their way were ships of war from eight other nations, including the British Commonwealth Fleet under Royal Navy command. Because the demands of war required a constantly shifting operational program, the Canadian ships often served in United States Navy task groups and at times they themselves led United Nations naval forces.

Escorting troop convoys to Pusan, screening the larger Royal Navy ships and carrying out independent sweeps through the south coast islands of Korea were among the first assignments given the Canadian destroyers. For the many veterans of World War II among the 700 officers and men aboard the three destroyers, the convoy runs and screening operations were like a breath of the old days—but without the U-boat attacks and roar of torpedoes exploding in the night.

The Canadian ships were fortunate in sustaining neither battle

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LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CHARLES T. McNAIR, *Royal Canadian Navy*, served as Information Officer with Canadian destroyers in Korean waters.



casualties nor damage during their year of participation in the Korean war. The same could not be said for enemy forces ashore who were soon to feel the fire of the Canadian naval guns.

Mid-August and the early weeks of September 1950 saw the Canadian ships running out their guns in action against shore positions. *HMCS Athabaskan* raked Taku Chaku and Hachibi Islands with her four-inch guns and, along with Republic of Korea Marines, landing parties of Canadian seamen went ashore to secure the islands from the enemy. Meanwhile the *Cayuga* carried out a heavy bombardment of Yosu harbor, and early in September the *Sioux* shelled Fankochi Point in the approaches to Inchon.

The invasion of Inchon provided the Royal Canadian Navy destroyers with their first major assignment—forming part of the 261-ship invasion fleet. The protection of American and British logistic support groups, close blockade, and full readiness as an antisubmarine hunter-killer force were the missions of the Canadian command. On 15 September 1950, the United States Marine 1st Division hit the beach at 0630 and Operation Chromite—the masterly assault on Inchon harbor—was under way. The Canadian ships were to have a busy time of it for the next few days.

The *Sioux* detonated three floating mines menacing the invasion fleet and the *Cayuga* and *Athabaskan* bombarded enemy installations on islands north of Kunsan. The *Athabaskan* also shelled the approaches to Taechon harbor. In the course of her patrol she located a minefield in Kunsan harbor and exploded five of the deadly objects.

The month of October passed without let-up for the United Nations fleet and the Canadian ships were at sea almost continually. While the *Cayuga* and *Sioux* operated off the west coast with a task group of the Royal Navy, the *Athabaskan* was with the United States Seventh Fleet, blockading the east coast of the Korean peninsula. It was during this patrol that the *Athabaskan* was dubbed the "Little Mo," a nickname the destroyer acquired while operating in company with the mighty *USS Missouri*.

Early in November the three destroyers received a brief respite from blockade and bombardment duty when they visited Hong Kong for a few days' rest period. As the *Cayuga* and *Athabaskan* steamed for the British Crown Colony in company, heavy weather dogged their run. The *Sioux* followed her sister Canadian destroyers a few days later and received an even worse buffeting. The 2000-ton ship sliced through the edge of a typhoon and in the wild seas she registered rolls of over 50 degrees. She eventually arrived in Hong Kong with lifeboats reduced to firewood, watertight doors twisted, guard rails bent and a two-inch funnel wire-stay snapped.

On 19 November the Canadian ships were back at the United Nations naval base in Japan with orders to sail the next day on what was to prove their longest continuous patrol of the war.

The destroyers were now veterans of more than three months of fighting. The ships' companies were in a high state of trained efficiency. The ships had proved their ability to work well with either British or American naval units. This experience was to meet its test, for in the first weeks of December the Canadians were to take the lead in the evacuation of Chinnampo.

In the deep valleys and formidable hills of Korea the war had swept north to the Yalu River. Then, without warning, the Red armies from China swarmed over the border and forced withdrawal of the United Nations ground forces. In many instances these forces found themselves encircled or cut off from the routes to the south.

At Chinnampo a fleet of transports and landing craft was standing by to evacuate more than 8000 civilians and army personnel, many of the latter wounded. Through the hills to the north the Chinese Communists were advancing rapidly on the town.

On 4 December the *Cayuga*, *Sioux* and *Athabaskan* along with the *USS Forrest Royal* and the Australian destroyers *Warramunga* and *Bataan*, were standing off the approaches to Chinnampo in response to an urgent message to assist in the withdrawal.

The channel into Chinnampo is a 40-mile semicircular route in the Taedong estuary. The stream, no wider than 600 yards, has dangerous shoals and shifting mudbanks; increasing the hazards, minefields were known to block the channel. By daylight it would be a difficult passage. On a moonless night the passage of ships into Chinnampo would be a gamble against steep odds.

During the daylight hours of 4 December, plans were being worked out for the dangerous passage. Then after nightfall came a flash from the commander of the transports and LSTs, "I am uncovered—take immediate action." The Canadian commander calculated the risks and accepted the gamble. At midnight the ships moved up the channel toward Chinnampo.

The *Cayuga* led the way through the minefields and shoals in the pitch-black night. In the *Cayuga's* operations room the navigator concentrated on probably the most ticklish navigational feat of the Korean conflict. Working almost entirely by radar he fixed the *Cayuga's* position no less than 132 times during the four-hour voyage. That was more than a fix every two minutes and the navigator almost wore a furrow in the deck between the radar scope and the chart table.

Even the most optimistic expected only three of the six ships to complete the journey. As it turned out only the *Sioux* and *Warra-*

*munga* ran aground on soft mudbanks but both ships soon extricated themselves and reported no serious damage. The success of the mission was largely due to the pin-point accuracy of the navigator.

By dawn of 5 December the United Nations ships were in Chinnampo and speedy loading of the transports began. Crammed with personnel and equipment, the transports and LSTs weighed anchor late in the afternoon and proceeded out of Chinnampo. The destroyers then opened fire on the military installations along the harbor front. For 40 minutes they laid down a murderous bombardment amid marshaling yards, oil storage tanks and freight cars.

Still the Canadian ships remained on patrol and early in January of 1951 the *Cayuga* figured in the withdrawal from Inchon. When she finally put back to Japan the *Cayuga* had spent 50 days on the job without let-up. The *Sioux* with 43 days and the *Athabaskan* with 33 days at sea were not far short of the mark.

The *Sioux* was relieved for return to Canada in mid-January by *HMCS Nootka*. The latter ship, based at Halifax, had steamed 12,000 miles to reach the war theater.


A few days later the *Nootka* saw action in Inchon harbor in company with the *Cayuga*. For the first time the Canadian ships came under fire from Communist shore batteries and, along with the *USS St. Paul*, engaged in a spirited encounter with the Reds.

Following the action at Inchon, the Canadian ships settled down for a long spell of screening aircraft carriers in the Yellow Sea.

The Korean action had settled into a seesaw stalemate and apparently a long-term commitment. Keeping up a rotation system for the Canadian ships, *HMCS Huron* relieved the *Cayuga* in the early spring and later the *Sioux* returned to send the *Athabaskan* home for a rest after more than ten months of service in the Far East.

The *Nootka*, *Sioux* and *Huron* were back in the inshore fighting again by the late spring months, seeing action on both the east and west coasts of Korea. The three ships all figured in press reports for their work off the east coast and they played a prominent part in bombardments of other trouble spots along the coastline.

On 25 June 1951 the Korean war was one year old. In it almost from the beginning, the Canadian ships had become an integral part of the United Nations Fleet. For the Canadian seamen there was the sober satisfaction that their ships had quickly answered the call to meet aggression in a far-off land and had played their parts well in this critical test of the United Nations strength.



These German organizational flags were captured near Hersfeld, Germany.

U. S. Army Photograph

# WAR TROPHIES TELL HISTORY'S STORY

*By*

EDWIN L. M. TAGGART

FROM the days when wars were fought with clubs and spears, down to comparatively modern times, to the victor belonged the spoils. It may have been Persians bringing back treasures of art, gold and precious gems from ancient Greece or Caesar's legionaries parading through the Roman Forum with their chained and degraded captives who were also regarded as booty. Later the Saracens despoiled African and European cities and Spaniards sailed the Main in galleons laden with Inca gold and silver. In the modern era, Napoleon systematically looted the collections of art and culture of all Europe. More recently, in the wake of his advancing armies, Hitler and his cohorts plundered private collections and museums of their finest works.

Gradually, however, there has evolved the concept that, as Emerich de Vattel stated in the 18th Century, only such material might be seized as "might strengthen the enemy and prolong the war." Although this high resolve has not always been adhered to, it is nevertheless a basic principle of modern war, clearly defined in the International Rules of Land Warfare and incorporated into the policy and regulations of the United States Army.

At the same time, it is inevitable that a great nation should amass, through its cycles of history, mementoes of periods of stress and of war exactly as a nation accumulates other evidence of its purely cultural progress. More and more it is evident that the art of war may preserve the arts of peace. The Monuments and Fine Arts Program of World War II—by which works of art and national shrines were protected by common agreement—is evidence of this endeavor.

A system for centralized recording of historical items belonging to the Department of the Army has been in operation for several years. The Historical Properties Branch, Office of the Chief of Military History, acts as custodian of works of art executed by servicemen in World War II and arranges for their distribution and display. The

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other services are equally active in furthering a program of preserving objects which may be considered graphic illustrations of the Nation's military history.

Unlike many other nations today, the United States has no central military museum. Until such a museum can be provided, the responsibility for preserving historical objects is incumbent upon every commander and all American citizens. While it may be that existing collections will be reevaluated with the passage of time, there is an obligation to hand on to posterity, in good condition and with proper supporting facts, a collection to work on. Meanwhile such objects as are already assembled make a continuing contribution to the morale of the Armed Forces and the civilian population.

Definition of what constitutes fair spoils or trophies of war—as distinguished from mere loot—is difficult. This is particularly true today when literature and the graphic arts are brought directly into the service of psychological warfare. It is not always easy to distinguish between a true art collection of cultural items and such propagandistic art work as the Nazis utilized “to further prolong the war.” On the one hand were the classical paintings brought to this country from Berlin for safekeeping and later returned to Germany. On the other hand are paintings, made by and for the Nazi propaganda machine, which may fairly be considered spoils of war. One such painting is that depicting Hitler astride a horse (although actually *Der Führer* was deathly afraid of animals) in the pose of a shining knight in armor. The painting, which had been used as an effective bit of propaganda, still bears a splintered gouge, inflicted when a hot-tempered soldier thrust his bayonet through the plywood on which the picture is painted. In a way, this added feature ties the painting to a dramatic and significant moment in the history of World War II, and writes “finis” to an infamous regime more graphically than any written word of document or formal ceremony.

The term “trophies” is far too encompassing a word, meaning one thing to a historian, another to a sports fan. Frequently reports received by Historical Properties Branch from the field include a conscientious listing of company service sports tournament *trophies*—whereas what was sought was a listing of art or historical trophies that might have been taken by the organization.

An Army directive defines the term—“historical properties (trophies) are military objects, trophies, memorabilia, paintings and drawings, and related material produced in any period by any country which are of substantial value to the nation-at-large by reason of their uniqueness, historical interest, association, intrinsic value or other consideration and which may be suitable for museum purposes.”




By this definition, many items are eliminated. Standard issue equipment, either friendly or enemy in origin, is not of immediate interest, since a source for such material exists in the collections of various technical services. Other exceptions include items which are related directly and inextricably to some one particular locale, even a specific building or spot. The plaque identifying the schoolhouse in Rheims where the World War II surrender was signed or a marker from the site of the Hiroshima atomic bomb blast depend upon the setting for their significance. Once separated from the original location, such items simply lose their meaning.

Objects not in themselves unique or possessed of any innate quality of historical or other value may acquire such value through association with an individual or an incident. Such items—desks, pens, even sofas—were avidly seized by the staff of General Grant after Lee's surrender at Appomattox and now are in various museums throughout the country.

The main consideration to be borne in mind in acquiring and holding objects of historical significance is that they should be *well authenticated*. For this reason the alertness of contemporaries in recognizing and recording the facts that set one object apart from others is of great importance in establishing the value of a trophy.

To decide whether any trophy may be worthy of an Army museum collection, three simple questions may be answered: Does it have real



This drum was presented to a United States Army unit by the South Staffordshire Regiment of the British Army.

U. S. Army Photograph

and individual interest? Is its authenticity unquestionable and supported by recorded fact? Would you, yourself, find it interesting in a museum? If the item meets those tests, then it may well be considered worthy of preservation, as "suitable for museum purposes."

Thus an item of clothing or furniture used by an historical figure naturally would assume the status of an historical trophy. The baton of Marshal Rodolfo Graziani of the Italian Army which currently is part of the Army's undisplayed collection is of permanent interest and value. Encased in a richly decorated casket, it bears inscriptions commemorating the victories of the Italian forces over the primitively armed Ethiopian tribes.

A totally different type of trophy in the Army's possession is the Staffordshire Drum. The drum and sticks and belt were presented "to the 10th Reinforcement Depot, U. S. Army, from their comrades in arms, the South Staffordshire Regiment of the British Army, to commemorate the period of war, September 1942 to 1945, during which the United States unit was quartered in the depot barracks of the South Staffordshire Regiment, Lichfield, Staffordshire, England, and as a lasting token of the mutual friendship and esteem between the two units."

Yet another type of war memento is the battle flag. Now displayed in the Great Hall of the National Archives building, on loan from the Department of the Army, is a collection of 29 historical German organizational standards—the very same ones often massed at the Nazi festivals in the Nuremberg Stadium. They cover a period from the late 18th Century to 1910 and all bear streamers and battle honors. The flags, made of heavy silk with elaborate embroidery, were used as historical material for inspiration of Germany's *Kadet Korps*.

These are but a few examples of the types of military trophies that the Department of the Army has acquired for its permanent collection. They serve to give commanders and others in the field an indication of the objects which should be safeguarded when and as found in the course of a military operation, looking toward the day when these mementoes can all be properly gathered together and displayed for the inspiration and edification of future generations.

# THE WORLD'S BIGGEST LITTLE AIRLINE

By

CAPTAIN MORTON E. MILLIKEN

FOR a mosquito to replace a jeep is a difficult job but the United States Army Signal Corps has accomplished this feat. The mosquito, it should be explained, is not an insect but an airplane—the light L-5 type which the Signal Corps has used to establish a small special-purpose fleet. Commonly known as “mosquitoes” the planes haul essential and bulky articles between Eighth Army and various corps and other headquarters in Korea.

Carrying cargo by plane is far from new; but in Korea about a year ago it became urgent enough for the Signal Corps to recruit five planes, five pilots and a ground crew of seven to establish the Air Section of the 304th Signal Operations Battalion. Pilots and planes were secured from Infantry and Artillery units which normally employ the light plane for observation and spotter duty. Since then, although the maximum pay load is limited to 400 pounds, the Air Section has hauled more than 30,000 pounds each month in about 80 flights. That means that each pilot puts in some 75 hours a month in the air—about one flight a day.

This midjet airline has relieved numerous jeeps and their drivers of a heavy hauling job over rough Korean trails. Although battlefield messages are flashed by radio, telephone or telegraph there are many bulky articles in modern warfare such as maps, records and transcriptions of orders that must be transported from one headquarters to another. Ordinarily this would be done by jeep or truck but in rugged terrain such as that of Korea, it does not take many miles of bouncing over rough roads or trails to cause breakdowns. Besides, with all of the vital traffic on the narrow roads, every vehicle which can be eliminated means more room for hauling guns, food, ammunition and other sinews of war.

The light plane was found to be one answer to these difficult conditions. While it frequently took a jeep two days to make a run from

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Army field headquarters to a corps headquarters and back, the L-5 makes the round trip in four hours or less. The first plane operated by the Signal Corps in this work relieved more than 15 jeeps that had previously been needed.

There is nothing fancy about the workings of this little airline; it simply fills a gap between jeep messengers and courier planes. Most division and corps headquarters can clear a landing strip near their headquarters. But often it is not sufficiently large for the big planes, or improvised fields cannot support the heavier types when rain makes the ground soggy. That is where the light plane proves serviceable.

A little before noon each day a jeep hauls to the landing area a load of mail sacks. These are checked in by a clerk who designates the plane which will carry each bag to its proper destination. The planes take off daily from Army headquarters airstrips after the ground crew—one mechanic to a plane—has given each a final check.

Pilots follow routes carefully plotted on an operations map and if nothing unusual happens they are back before sundown. Each pilot picks his best course from the weather information given him before taking off; he tells the operations room clerk which route he will take and when he arrives at his destination he telephones back the route by which he will return. Thus if a plane is forced down or gets into trouble of any kind, searchers will at least have an idea of its approximate whereabouts.

But except for those measures, the mosquito pilot is largely on his own in navigating from one temporary landing strip to another. He travels much like an Indian scout, checking his position with known landmarks along the way. Rivers, mountains, roads, lakes and villages all serve as his guides. Usually he flies within view of main supply roads where he can get help if he has to make a forced landing. So far, however, no plane or pilot has been lost. And in a country notorious for poor flying weather, these mosquito pilots have been obliged to remain on the ground only about a dozen times in a year of operation.

Thus the mosquito has supplemented the jeep—replacing it in the field allotted to the L-5—and the Signal Corps has maintained its tiny fleet carrying small but vital cargo. In the 304th Signal Operations Battalion they call it “the world’s biggest little airline.”

# SCHOOL FOR COMMAND CONFERENCE LEADERS

By

LIEUTENANT COLONEL E. J. WILLSON

"SOMETHING sure got into the sergeant—that was a doggone good presentation he gave us today," remarked a soldier to a companion as the two emerged from a Command Conference hour in Tripoli. The companion agreed.

They were right; something *had* happened to the sergeant. He had just returned from the two-week course at the EUCOM Troop Information and Education School at Frankfurt-Griesheim where Command Conference leaders are trained in presenting the Information and Education program of the American Zone of Germany.

The sergeant and some seventy others, officers and noncommissioned officers alike, had received an intensive 84-hour course in the entire program, with special emphasis on techniques for conducting Command Conference hours. On returning to his own organization—company, battalion, regiment or other type unit—each approached his job with new zest and with a greater understanding of the value of Information and Education.

The unique two-week course is given to Army and Air Force officers and enlisted personnel. Another course of 40 hours trains officers connected with the Information and Education program in the mechanics and techniques of conducting briefing periods and the weekly Command Conference; it also covers the mission and administration of the program. Student quotas are established for each of the major commands in EUCOM and, on an invitational basis, for United States Air Forces Europe, United States Forces Austria, and Trieste United States Troops.

Although but little known, the School now has embarked on its seventh year of activity. It was launched in 1944 as a training center for discussion leaders in London, with a branch opening within a month in Paris. After V-E day the School was moved to Germany where it has had several different locations. Early this year it was established as part of the 7700th Troop Information and Education

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Group in Griesheim, a suburb of Frankfurt. The Group also includes the operational headquarters of the Army Education Program in EUCOM, the USAFI Supply Section and Depot, the EUCOM Information Bulletin and Attitude Research Sections.

The School, occupying a two-story wing of a modern building, has instruction facilities of the latest type. On the main floor are a well-stocked reference library and reading room, a model Information and Education Center, a student lounge, eight classrooms and a training aids workshop.

To understand what made the sergeant's listeners agree that he had changed, and for the better, follow one of the students through the two-week course of study.

First of all, he has to meet the minimum entrance qualification of a General Classification Test score of at least 100, or graduation from high school. He is one of about seventy who arrives over the week end from any of the military or air installations in France, Great Britain or Western Germany, from Vienna or Trieste, or even from Tripoli in North Africa. Members of the armed forces of France and Great Britain may be included in the group, too.

At his first class at 0800 Monday the student is welcomed by representatives of the Chief, Armed Forces Information and Education Division, EUCOM, and meets the staff and faculty, headed by Major H. J. Anderson, School Commandant. He is somewhat surprised to find that the teaching staff numbers only five officers, five enlisted men and two United States civilian education experts.

After a brief orientation on the objectives of the curriculum and on the School and post facilities, the student attends a class on the Information and Education mission. This includes a skit which demonstrates the effects of unbalanced information in the services. A symposium on the sources of negative attitudes and how these can be rectified by a well-conducted Troop Information Program follows. The morning closes with a film and demonstration on the committee method of leading the Command Conference.

The second half of the first day begins with an actual presentation of a Command Conference based on the current *EUCOM Information Bulletin* subject. This is followed by a lecture on the responsibilities of program leaders and another on military instruction. During the last hour of the day, the student body is divided into classroom groups, each comprising ten to twelve students, and individual instructors take over the further elaboration of public speaking and presentation techniques.

The student begins actual participation the next day when he presents the first of two three-minute talks required of him. After con-



confidence in speaking before his group is attained, he prepares a twenty-minute presentation—either of the lecture or conference type. He is assigned a particular topic and is guided by his instructor through its preparation, outlining, note-taking and assembly of visual aids.

In the group room which is the workshop or laboratory of the School, the student presents his subject before his fellow-students who then discuss the presentation under the instructor's guidance. Through practice and critique, each man learns to improve the content and method of his presentation. He finds out how to adapt the *EUCOM Information Bulletin* for oral presentation and how to use the printed outline which is supplied with it as a visual aid for the Command Conference.

Eventually the student is ready to lead a full hour Command Conference. Command and education announcements and a brief summary of the week's new highlights are given. Then follows a discussion of his assigned subject, organization of committees, supervision of their deliberations, presentation of committee reports and summarization.

Alternately, he will be attending classes in the auditorium where necessary background information is given him—hours on American Democracy and Government, American Security, Foreign Policy and the Evolution of Military Policy. Other hours in which political as well as geographic and social factors are stressed deal with France, Great Britain, Germany, the Middle East and the Far East. These are presented in a variety of ways including lecture, conference, symposium and panel methods. The use of films, quizzes, guest speakers and skits is demonstrated and taught. The student also receives instruction in the installation and maintenance of Information Centers and methods of devising and improvising training aids.

A block of four hours is devoted to the education portion of the program, including Education Centers, the establishment and operation of off-duty and on-duty classes, the keeping of records, USAFI supply, and the testing and accreditation services offered to members of the Armed Forces.

Briefing procedures—a focal point of the 40-hour course—are also covered in the two-week curriculum. Much emphasis is given to this topic as an important prerequisite to efficient operation of the Information program.

A break from school routine occurs the second Wednesday of each course when the student body visits the broadcasting studios of the American Forces Network in near-by Hoechst and the offices and printing plant of *Stars and Stripes* in Darmstadt.

Graduation does not mean severance from the School. Inquiries

regarding problems of operation in the field, questions on new techniques and subject matter are constantly being received from former students and are answered by faculty members. In addition, the Liaison Section attached to the Group maintains constant contact with the field, visiting installations in an effort to improve the quality of personnel performance and service to the troops.

The teaching staff is sometimes called upon to travel throughout the Zone, conducting refresher courses and familiarization surveys for the benefit of newly arrived personnel. During the past four summers, the School has been closed for periods varying from two to four months to allow individual instructors and teams to go into the field where they evaluate at first hand the problems of administering the program.

The arrival of new Armed Forces personnel in Europe these days in increasing numbers poses a challenge to an effective Information and Education program, manned by capable leaders. The EUCOM Troop Information and Education School is prepared to meet the challenge. In carrying on its mission of enlightenment, it seeks to insure that proven fighting caliber shall be matched by strong moral conviction.

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Baron Frederick William von Steuben, a Prussian officer, served as Inspector General with the American revolutionary army. Discussing the characteristics of the American soldier as contrasted with his European contemporaries, von Steuben wrote to the Baron de Gaudy in 1778:

"In the first place the genius of this nation [America] is not in the least to be compared with that of the Prussians, Austrians or French. You say to your soldier, 'Do this,' and he doeth it. But I am obliged to say [to an American soldier], 'This is the reason why you ought to do that,' and then he does it."

## ARMY LANDMARKS

### *The Tomb of The Unknown Soldier*

Bands played softly; church bells tolled; booming guns rendered slow-cadenced salutes. The President of the United States, members of his Cabinet, highest ranking Army and Navy officers and other dignitaries of our own Nation and of nations all over the world marched slowly behind a black-draped gun caisson drawn by six black horses. That somber caisson carried a casket, flag-draped.

Thirty years ago the entire Nation was paying homage as The Unknown Soldier was brought home from France to rest at Arlington National Cemetery in a simple marble tomb that has become a national shrine.

It was on 11 November 1921 that the President conferred upon The Unknown Soldier the Medal of Honor and the Distinguished Service Cross. Emissaries of other nations presented their highest decorations for military valor.

The Unknown Soldier was representative of the unidentified American dead of World War I. Four of these from American Military Cemeteries in France had been taken in steel gray caskets to Chalons-sur-Marne where thousands of grateful French visited the city hall and paid tribute. On 24 October 1921, a World War I veteran, then with the United States Army of Occupation, placed a bouquet of flowers upon one of the unmarked caskets. Thus The Unknown Soldier was chosen.


From Chalons, the casket was moved to Le Havre and placed aboard the *Olympia*, former flagship of Admiral Dewey, and brought to Washington.

There inside the Capitol rotunda and on the same catafalque where previously had rested the three martyred presidents—Lincoln, Garfield and McKinley—The Unknown Soldier lay in state. Thousands of persons including representatives of foreign nations passed through in an unending stream and the huge room was heaped with floral offerings.

Today the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is the focal point of nation-wide memorial observances. Annually on Armistice Day the President and other officials lay wreaths and conduct ceremonies. And every day citizens of all ages and from all walks of life, and people of many other nations, come to pay tribute to American fighting men, alive and dead, known and unknown, whom The Unknown Soldier symbolizes.

(Picture on back cover.)

U. S. Army Photograph



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